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It is this third section that will be of
greatest interest to Western scholars
seeking insights into PLA thinking
about China’s strategic situation. The
authors of this volume believe that
China, both a land and a sea power,
faces multifaceted strategic opportunities and challenges. Despite its eighteenthousand-kilometer coastline, China is
currently constrained by the world’s
longest island chain, centering on strategically, politically, and economically
vital Taiwan. Taiwan is far from
China’s only disputed territory, however: “1,000,000 square kilometers” of
maritime territory, “one ninth of
China’s national land territory,” remains under contention. The authors
also identify energy supply security as
critical to China’s national development. Their statement that the South
China Sea possesses “rich oil reserves
equivalent to that of [the] Middle East”
conflicts with Western assessments,
however, leaving the reader wondering
about the true strategic underpinnings
of Beijing’s claims.
The authors foresee possible threats to
China’s “sovereignty, maritime rights,
and great cause of reunification,”
threats that, should all other measures
fail, may necessitate a defensive (and
therefore inherently just) war on
China’s “borderlines, seacoasts, and air
spaces.” The resulting “high-tech local
wars” may well require the PLA to confront a technologically superior adversary. Accordingly, the authors suggest
emphasizing preemption; employment
of a broad spectrum of military technologies, including asymmetric “trump
card” weapons; and integration of civilian and military forces in missions (e.g.,
“guerrilla warfare on the sea”) that incorporate political, economic, and legal
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warfare. While this volume raises as
many questions as it answers, it is nevertheless a welcome contribution to a vital field in which so little authoritative
information is available.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Howarth, Peter. China’s Rising Sea Power: The
PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge. New York:
Frank Cass, 2006. 198pp. $125

Peter Howarth, an Australian former
diplomat and intelligence analyst, presents an excellent mix of strategic theory, political dynamics, and tactical
detail in considering the Chinese submarine fleet. His treatment demonstrates a keen understanding of both
parts of the phrase “politico-military
strategy,” and it is the type of thinking
that Jeffrey Record of the Air War College recently opined is too often missing in the American community.
Indeed, the book is a pleasure to read, if
only because one gets to visit so many
old friends in strategic theory, such as
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Corbett,
Bernard Brodie, Hervé Coutau-Begarie,
Raoul Castex, Andre Beaufre, René
Daveluy, Colin Gray, Carl Döenitz, and
Herbert Rosinski, as well as Mao Tsetung, Deng Xiaoping, and Sun Tzu.
Like so many others who write about
China’s navy since the fall of the Berlin
Wall, Howarth is inclined to make sensational claims on the subject, presumably thereby justifying the work and
attracting attention. However, what distinguishes Howarth from so many others who have searched and found
reasons to be alarmed at the conventional naval power of China is that he
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tempers the sensational with frank assessments of China’s limitations.
At the heart of this examination of Chinese submarines, practically speaking, is
the potential showdown over Taiwan.
While Howarth notes that “China, like
Germany, is handicapped by geography,” he points out that the defense of
Taiwan is equally handicapped by
oceanography: its narrow and crowded
seas are ideal for diesel submarines. His
frankness, however, about such U.S.
problems as naval drawdown, global responsibility, vulnerability of surface
ships to missile saturation, and the difficulties of operations in narrow seas
gives one new pause.
As an example of what is best about his
work, Howarth considers not only the
tactical problems for China, Taiwan,
and the United States (including the
exact requirements for successful submarine warfare against a carrier-based
navy) but also the proper political context of that potential conflict—that a
politically free and economically prosperous Taiwan is a dagger pointed at
the heart of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to
the intersection of tactics and strategic
judgment, Howarth includes in his final
chapter an economical summary of the
logic by which Chinese decision makers
might be optimistic enough about their
chances for success to initiate a conflict
with Taiwan.
One weakness in this confluence of politics, strategy, and tactical matchups is
that Howarth exaggerates the strategic
influence of the great thinkers on policy.
His demonstration of how submarine
warfare fits with Sun Tzu overreaches,
suggesting as it does that submarine
warfare fits perfectly with preformed
Chinese strategic preferences. The logic
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of a preemptive surprise attack is part
of the Chinese strategic culture, he says,
but one does not have to cite the number of wars per year in which the Ming
dynasty engaged, for example, in order
to support the conclusion that “the
Pentagon has some justification in considering that the risk of Beijing resorting to force to try to resolve the Taiwan
issue is growing with the modernization
and transformation of the PRC’s military capabilities.”
Howarth is better off with his more elegant logic that submarines are designed
for the task of concealment and surprise and that surprise is a good tactic
when one’s forces are inferior. Eastern
and Western war planners have both
made use of the submarine and have
appreciated it for the qualities for which
it is designed, regardless of whether
they were Chinese or their ancient ancestors were contemporaries of Sun Tzu.
Nonetheless, it is exactly this effort to
blend classic strategic thinking with
current politics and tactical complexities that is informative, intelligent, and
provocative in this book. It is recommended for any library on naval affairs
or Asian conflict, and good reading for
both U.S. and Chinese war planners.
PETER J. WOOLLEY

Fairleigh Dickinson University

Cole, Bernard D. Taiwan’s Security: History and
Prospects. New York: Routledge, 2006. 254pp.
$125

Given the importance of the Taiwan issue for U.S. foreign and security policy
in East Asia, it is striking that relatively
little has been written on Taiwan’s defense reform and modernization
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